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EFFICIENT MARKETS, HUBRIS, CHAOS,
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND TAKEOVERS
NICHOLAS WOLFSON*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Richard Posner has recently written about the de-
mise of legal scholarship as an autonomous subject' due to devel-
opments in the social sciences, such as economics.2 It is no longer
possible for legal scholars to deal with the law as an independent
body of cases and statutes subject only to the particular linguistic
felicity of lawyers and law professors. Legal scholars must inevita-
bly deal with other disciplines, such as economics and psychology, 3
when attempting to advance knowledge in a particular legal field.
It is, and perhaps always was, futile to attempt to advance learning
by merely analyzing cases and statutes with the familiar legal tools
of analogy and linguistic acumen.
One of the fields that has been most affected by this develop-
ment is that of corporate law. This subject has been vastly modi-
fied by modern developments in finance theory, such as the effi-
cient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model.4
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B. Columbia College,
J.D. Harvard Law School. The author thanks Stephen Utz, Ward S. Curran, Kurt Strasser,
and Philip Hamburger for helpful comments on earlier versions.
I See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 761, 761 (1987). "The idea that law is an autonomous discipline .... a subject
properly entrusted to persons trained in law and in nothing else, was originally a political
idea." Id. at 762. The autonomy of law was challenged as far back as 1897 by Justice Oliver
Wendel Holmes. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
Holmes had predicted that economists and statisticians would play a much larger role in the
future. See id. It was not until a half century later that Holmes' prediction began to come
true. See Posner, supra, at 766-67. Other factors that have changed legal scholarship include
developments in the field of philosophy, particularly in areas related to law such as abor-
tion, obscenity, capital punishment and women's rights, and the collapse of society's confi-
dence that lawyers will correct the major problems of the legal system. Id. at 767-69.
2 Posner, supra note 1, at 767-69.
3 RATIONAL CHOICE, THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (R. Hogarth
& M. Reder eds. 1987) [hereinafter CONRAST].
4 See E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE (1976); Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion
and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 passim (1984).
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Perhaps the most significant area of discussion and research in the
realm of corporate law has been that of corporate takeovers.5
Takeovers have been viewed as the cause of the bull market of the
1980's," and a proposed tax increase on takeovers has been blamed
See Jensen,The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN.
J. 6, 6 (1986). Professor Jensen observed:
The market for corporate control is fundamentally changing the corporate land-
scape. Transactions in this market in 1985 were at a record level of $180 billion, 47
percent above the $122 billion in 1984. The purchase price in 36 of the 3,000 deals
exceeded a billion dollars in 1985, compared with 18 in 1984.
Id. (citing W. T. Grimm, Mergerstat Review [1985] for his data).
Arthur Fleischer, Jr., in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Telecommu-
nications and Finance on July 9, 1987 referred to the following data from W.T. Grimm,
Mergerstat Review (1986):
Chart 1 1983 1984 1985 1986
Acquisitions 2,533 2,543 3,001 3,336
No. involving
Public companies 190 211 336 386
Tender Offers 37 79 84 150
Contested Tender
Offers 11 18 32 40
Written Statement on the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987 (H.R. 2172) and the Securities
Trading Reform Act of 1987 (H.R. 2668), Appearance Before the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (Statement of Arthur
Fleischer, Jr.) [hereinafter Fleisher].
Individual contested bids and acquisitions may be enormous and of great significance to
shareholders and the local communities. Martin Lipton points out that, for example, Pantry
Pride acquired Revlon "by means of a $1.7 billion hostile tender offer." Lipton, Corporate
Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 n.40 (1987). Many
of these deals are structured with risky bond financing or "junk bonds." See id. Some exam-
ples are Turner Broadcasting System's unsuccessful bid for CBS ($5.4 million in junk fi-
nancing) and Revlon Group Inc.'s bid for Gillette Co. ($3.9 billion in junk bonds). See id. at
11 n.42.
An influential piece on takeovers and the market for control is Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). There has been an outpouring
of articles on this topic. Some representative samples are: Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover
Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation,
71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Coffee, Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1146 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819 (1981); Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 153 (1986); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV.
111 (1987).
1 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 9 (1988). Other
factors contributing to the bull market included stock retirements arising from mergers,
leveraged buyouts and share repurchase programs, and an increasing tendency to include
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for the October crash.7 In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act'
to protect the shareholders of target corporations9 by requiring full
disclosure from the tender offeror. 10 The Act also requires (as im-
plemented or perfected by rules) certain substantive protections
such as withdrawal rights, minimum open periods for the bid, and
rights of proration.11 Commission rules also restrict the target
management by setting limits on target repurchase12 and target
management disclosure.1 3 The underlying philosophy calls for
maintaining a balance between bidder and target.1 4
takeover premiums in the valuation of a large number of stocks. Id.
I Id. at 15. On October 14, 1987, members of the House Ways and Means Committee
announced the filing of legislation to eliminate the tax benefits associated with the financing
of corporate takeovers. Id.
s 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f), 78s (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
9 The United States Supreme Court recently gave a brief summary of the Act:
Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968 in response to the increasing number of
hostile tender offers. Before its passage, these transactions were not covered by
the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. The Williams Act,
backed by regulations of the SEC, imposes requirements in two basic areas. First,
it requires the offeror to file a statement disclosing information about the offer,
including: the offeror's background and identity; the source and amount of the
funds to be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase, including
any plans to liquidate the company or make major changes in its corporate struc-
ture; and the extent of the offeror's holdings in the target company.
Second, the Williams Act, and the regulations that accompany it, establish
procedural rules to govern tender offers. For example, stockholders who tender
their shares may withdraw them while the offer remains open, and, if the offeror
has not purchased their shares, any time after 60 days from commencement of the
offer. The offer must remain open for at least 20 business days. If more shares are
tendered than the offeror sought to purchase, purchases must be made on a pro
rata basis from each tendering shareholder. Finally, the offeror must pay the same
price for all purchases; if the offering price is increased before the end of the offer,
those who already have tendered must receive the benefit of the increased price.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 79-80 (1987) (citations omitted).
"Congress sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary
information but also by witholding from management or the bidder any undue advantage
that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice." Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
634 (1982) (citation omitted).
,0 See R. GnzsON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 934-48 (1986).
The Act requires the bidder to make certain disclosures as specified by Commission regula-
tion. Id. at 937-48.
See id. at 979.
12 See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, THE OCTOBER
1987 MARKET BREAK 6 (1988).
"3 See R. GILSON, supra note 10, at 948.
U, See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 1162-63. The goals of the Williams Act
were set forth by the Supreme Court in Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982):
There is no question that in imposing these requirements, Congress intended
to protect investors. But it is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to
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Related legislation, 15 as well as efforts to amend it, have been
influenced enormously by evaluations of the impact of unsolicited
tender offers.16 Scholarship in this field has also been influenced by
stock price studies into the effect, positive or negative, of takeovers
on shareholder welfare. 17 Needless to say, if the aggregate unsolic-
protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bid-
der .... Congress became convinced "that takeover bids should not be discour-
aged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but
inefficient management." It also became apparent that entrenched management
was often successful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation evolved,
therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention to provide a weapon for manage-
ment to discourage takeover bids," and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality.
Id. (citations omitted).
"5 See Finkelstein, The New Delaware Takeover Statute, 21 SECURITIES & COh1MODI-
TIES REGULATION 47 (1988). "For more than a decade, various states have sought to regulate
non-negotiated takeover bids .... After the 1987 Supreme Court decision in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America [upholding the constitutionality of an Indiana statute] a num-
ber of states began to examine the advisability of advising new statutes .... At least 27
states now have laws specifically regulating takeover transactions. Id.
Supporters of the values of takeovers have criticized such legislation. For example, SEC
Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest wrote that:
these statutes are, to quote Mr. Justice Scalia, "economic folly." [CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).] In the aggregate, these statutes cause substantial harm to our economy.
They slow a restructuring process that is necessary and beneficial if American in-
dustry is to become fully competitive in an internationalized trading environment;
they impede the reorganization of conglomerate structures that may have outlived
their usefulness; they impair the market's ability to allocate capital to its highest
valued use; and they deter productivity enhancing reorganizations that increase
output per worker and thereby secure American jobs in a highly competitive
marketplace.
Corporations and Acquisitions-Special Voting Requirements and Control Share Acquisi-
tions Concerning House Bill No. 1321, Before the Judiciary Committee of the Maryland
House of Delegates, at 1-2 (1988) (statement of Joseph A. Grundfest, Commissioner, SEC).
1" See e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN.
L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698, 699 (1982); Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Of-
fers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277, 279-280 (1984); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant
Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 809-
18 (1982); Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1029; Gilson, supra note 5, at 842-45.
11 See, e.g., Ruback, The Conoco Takeover and Stockholder Returns, SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 13, 13-33 (1982); Ruback, An Economic View of the Market for Corporate Control, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L. 613, 616-19 (1984); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 557-64.
Arthur Fleischer stated:
At present, the evidence as to the overall impact of unsolicited offers is, in our
view, unclear. Most of the research cited by proponents of takeover activity cen-
ters on stock price studies. On the one hand, these studies show that takeovers
significantly increase the wealth of target shareholders and also increase the
wealth of successful bidder shareholders, although the latter benefit to a lesser
extent. On the other hand, these studies only examine stock prices over short peri-
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ited takeover gain of target and bidder shareholders is negative,
there is good reason to restrict tender offers and less reason to 'crit-
icize intrusive legislation designed to limit such takeovers. If unso-
licited tender offers positively affect target shareholders but, to a
lesser extent, negatively impact bidders, a somewhat more optimis-
tic appraisal of tender offers is possible. If unsolicited takeovers
generally benefit target shareholders, and neither hurt nor benefit
bidder shareholders, an even more benign interpretation of the
phenomenon is possible.
The shareholder stock price studies used to evaluate the im-
pact are based upon a philosophy of efficient market-rational ex-
pectations. As is true in much of traditional economic research, the
theory and studies assume that multitudes of rational investors
buy and sell securities based upon a rational prediction of the fu-
ture returns on investments."8 Fads and fashions are generally ig-
nored by economists. Thus economists usually depreciate the theo-
ries of psychologists which typically encompass the irrational
thought processes of individuals. 9 The reference to "irrational"
does not imply a mild form of madness. As Herbert A. Simon
points out, psychologists agree that people have reasons for what
they do; although they may not coldly maximize gain or utility in
the fashion economists suppose, "[t]hey have motivations, and
they use reason (well or badly) to respond to these motivations and
reach their goals."20 In this respect, a seminal paper by economics
Professor Richard Roll, entitled The Hubris Hypothesis of Corpo-
rate Takeovers,2' is of crucial importance in that it departs from
the rationalist approach of economic theory. If Roll's hypothesis is
ods of time and typically do not cover the period after completion of a merger.
Fleischer, supra note 5, at 8.
Many would argue that the evidence was positive. In a recent paper, SEC Commissioner
Joseph Grundfest argued that the event study data conclusively proved that "a conservative
estimate of gains from takeovers from public companies in this period is 139.8 billion."
Grundfest & Black, Stock Market Profits from Takeover Activity Between 1981 and 1986:
$167 Billion is a Lot of Money, at 38 (SEC News Release Sept. 1987).
18 See Kleidon, Anomalies in Financial Economics: Blueprint for Change?, in CON-
TRAST, supra note 3, at 285-315. Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, however, has pointed out: "If
agents are all alike, there is really no room for trade. The very basis of economic analysis,
from Smith on, is the existence of differences in agents." Arrow, Rationality of Self and
Others in an Economic System, in CONTRAST, supra note 3, at 205. If agents are different in
unspecifiable ways, then this creates an obvious problem in analysis. Id.
,9 For a dissenting view on the value of psychological research, see Shiner, Comments
on Miller and Kleidon, in CONTRAST, supra note 3, at 317-21.
20 Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in CONRAST, supra note 3, at.25.
21 Rol, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986).
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valid, then a considerable body of legal scholarship on unsolicited
takeovers may need to be revised. If, at a minimum, the paper is
worthy of consideration and further investigation, then legal schol-
arship on the nature of suitable regulation must be of an extremely
tentative nature until the paper is proven or rebutted beyond some
degree of reasonable belief.
The potentially drastic impact of the Roll paper illustrates the
force of remarks, by scholars such as R. Coase, that economists
would someday virtually expropriate scholarship.2" It is also part of
a growing literature that has suggested-although the proposition
is not yet proven-systematic divergence from the patterns of ra-
tional economic behavior.2 The Roll paper is part of a growing
body of research that tends to cast doubt upon a dogmatic adher-
ence to efficient market-rational choice theory. Even some of its
most ardent supporters may have been a bit disturbed by the re-
cent October 1987 crash and its assault upon rational choice
theory.24
Roll analyzes the relevant empirical research on takeovers in
the light of a psychological hypothesis. If his research proves cor-
rect, much of current policy-oriented legal scholarship on proper
takeover legislation and judicial approach will have to be reexam-
ined. Descriptive law scholarship, for example, treatise exposition,
will thus turn to a summary of new cases and legislation. In other
fields this process is called a review of the literature to distinguish
it from original research.
The development of the so-called "Chaos theory" 2 constitutes
an even more radical break from traditional theory than that im-
plied by the use of psychology. As developed in this paper, the
Chaos theory requires a radical restructuring of finance theory, law
(insofar as it relies upon finance theory), and at least a partial
abandonment of the long-held notions of the random walk and effi-
cient market hypotheses. At the outset, I should point out that I
am not attempting to validate the Roll thesis, the Chaos theory, or
other critiques of orthodox economic theory. That is an endeavor
which depends upon experiment, research, and further experiment,
all of which are very likely to come up, in the final analysis with a
22 Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1978).
23 See CONTRAST, supra note 3 passim.
24 See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
25 See J. GLEICK, CHAOS (1987); see also infra notes 89-128 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of Chaos theory).
[Vol. 63:511
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mouse rather than a lion. As one scholar has forcefully pointed out,
Roll and others who challenge orthodoxy must bear a great bur-
den.26 The point I do make in this paper is that legal scholarship in
the area of corporate takeover, as well as in other areas of corpo-
rate law, is derivative of, and almost parasitical upon, the research
done by psychologists, economists, and, as Chaos theory shows,
mathematicians. Only to the extent that legal scholars become cog-
nizant of these social sciences can they partake in serious scholar-
ship.27 Otherwise, they are destined to be astute students of ortho-
doxy in other fields, always behind the knowledge curve as the
flaws of orthodoxy are revealed. They are limited to the writing of
treatises which merely describe the outpouring of prior decisions
and legislative bodies.
, In Part I, I will evaluate the significance of the paper by Pro-
fessor Roll. Part II will analyze the Roll paper's impact on recent
legal literature. In Part III, I will discuss other uses of behaviorial
theory, similar to the Roll paper, to develop certain anomalies in
finance literature. In Part IV, I will develop the impact of the new
theory of Chaos on finance theory and the law. I will conclude by
further developing the notion of law as a derivative field of
scholarship.
PART I: THE HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS
One of the key questions raised regarding unsolicited tender
offers is whether they have a positive or negative impact on corpo-
rate efficiency. A popular view is that unsolicited takeovers, on av-
erage, displace inefficient managements and hence serve as a useful
check on corporate control groups.2" Other theorists argue that on
average, or in some significant number (however defined), take-
overs maximize synergy-the .combination of disparate businesses
resulting in lower costs of doing business.29 Some theorists point to
tax savings as a significant cause of takeovers."0 Others argue that
26 See Kleidon, supra note 18, at 312-13.
27 Fortunately, there are some scholars who have already bridged the creative gap. A
prominent example is Dean Henry Manne, who, in a series of articles, explored the meaning
of law in light of modem economic theory. See Manne, supra note 5, passim; Manne, Some
Theoretical Aspects of Shore Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, passim (1964).
28 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 1173.
29 See Warshawsky, Determinants of Corporate Merger Activity: A Review of the
Literature, at 6 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 1987).
30 Id. at 4.
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
corporate takeovers generally maximize managerial utility, not
shareholder utility.3 1 A variation on the prior theory maintains
that acquisitions are driven by a desire to restrict competition.2
Still other theorists argue that takeovers are stimulated by ineffi-
ciencies in the market that leave certain corporations undervalued
in relationship to their real or intrinsic worth.33 Some theorists
may argue that some or all of the above account for the unsolicited
takeover phenomenon. 4
Roll argues that the empirical data demonstrate that "take-
over gains may have been overestimated if they exist at all.""m He
points out that there is considerable reason to believe that there
are no aggregate gains associated with takeovers.3 6
If this is in fact true, how does one account for unsolicited
bids? Roll argues for what he terms the "hubris hypothesis.""
The hubris hypothesis is founded on the simple premise that
takeovers reflect individual overconfidence. The bidder/manager,
while evaluating the proposed acquisition, erroneously convinces
himself that his valuation is correct and that the market does not
reflect the realizable economic value of the combined firm. 8
The next hurdle is to explain the existence and persistence of
hubris. Roll departs from the usual rational expectations model of
economists and adopts the irrationality assumptions of certain
psychologists:
Psychologists are constantly bombarding economists with empiri-
cal evidence that individuals do not always make rational deci-
sions under uncertainty .... Among psychologists, economists
have a reputation for arrogance mainly-because this evidence is
ignored; but psychologists seem not to appreciate that economists
disregard the evidence on individual decision making because it
usually has little predictive content for market behavior. Corpo-
rate takeovers are, I believe, one area: of research in which this
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32 See Warsbawsky, supra note 29, at 6-7.
33 Id. at 8.
" See Jensen, supra note 5, at 12-13. Jensen discusses additional theories to explain
takeovers. For example, he mentions his free cash theory which, in part, asserts that manag-
ers with too much cash sometimes use it wastefully instead of paying it out to shareholders.
Certain takeovers will create value by creating debt, which forces managers to make cuts in
unnecessary expansion programs. Id.
15 Roll, supra note 21, at 198.
36 Id. at 202-06.
31 Id. at 197.
11 Id. at 199-200.
[Vol. 63:511
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usually valid reaction of economists should be abandoned; take-
overs reflect individual decisions.
There is little reason to expect that a particular individual
bidder will refrain from bidding because he has learned from his
own past errors. Although some firms engage in many acquisi-
tions, the average individual bidder/manager has the opportunity
to make only a few takeover offers during his career. He may con-
vince himself that the valuation is right and that the market does
not reflect the full economic value of the combined firm.39
Roll's paper is based upon competitive bidding strategy, which
indicates that successful bidders are infected by the winner's
curse,40 a systematic tendency to overestimate value. Proponents of
the theory have pointed out that "[i]n competitive bidding, the
winner tends to be the player who most overestimates true tract
value. '41 They have also concluded that "[h]e who bids on a parcel
what he thinks it is worth will, in the long run, be taken for a
cleaning. '42 Despite the objection that, on average, bidders might
be correct, although sometimes high and sometimes low, the cru-
cial point is that winning bids are, in fact, not correct on average.
As the theorists point out, "in a takeover situation a bidder/man-
ager has a poor chance of winning when he has underestimated
value and has a good chance of winning when he has overestimated
it."14 3 Therefore, the theorists have presented a mathematical
model to the effect that a "player tends to win a biased set of
tracts-namely, those on which he has overestimated value or
reserves." 44
Takeovers are similar to bidding auctions, even when there is
only one bidder.45 In a tender offer, the market is the initial bidder
and the corporate offeror is the second bidder.46 Roll points out
39 Id. at 199-200.
40 Id. at 200; see Varaiya & Ferris, Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers: The Winner's
Curse, FIN. ANALYSTS. J., May-June 1987, at 64.
4, Capen, Clapp & Campbell, Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, J. PETRo-




45 "In 1983, for instance, bidders in contested tender offers acquired the target in 7 of
11 attempts (63%), while in 1986 bidders succeeded in just 15 of 40 contested offers (38%).
The success rate has usually been less than 50% . . . ." Fleischer, supra note 5, at 4-5.
However, when acquisitions by friendly bidders, i.e., white knights, are factored in, then
"the likelihood of targets remaining independent varies, but is around 1 in 4." Id. at 5.
41 Roll, supra note 21, at 200.
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that "[t]he hubris hypothesis is consistent with strong-form mar-
ket efficiency, '47 i.e., the assumed efficiency of financial, product
and labor markets. Hence, no reorganization can bring aggregate
gains. Other explanations of takeovers assume "strong-form mar-
ket inefficiency of at least a temporary duration. '48 For example,
since labor markets are inefficient, takeovers can result in aggre-
gate gains by eliminating inefficient management.49 Roll argues,
perhaps with some irony, that the hubris hypothesis is "the null
against which other hypotheses of corporate takeovers should be
compared. '50 The Roll hypothesis indicates that, on average, in-
creases in target shareholder gains should be more than counter-
balanced by decreases in bidder shareholder losses, with takeover
expenses accounting for the aggregate net loss. 51 Roll argues that
"[t]he central prediction of the hubris hypothesis is that the total
combined takeover gain to target and bidding firm shareholders is
nonpositive."52
47 Id.
'6 Id. at 201.
'9 See id.
50 Id. at 201.
51 Id.
11 Id. at 202; see also id. at 205-06 (discussing studies by economists showing that exis-
tence of either gains or losses to combined firms involved in corporate combinations remains
in doubt). For a discussion on losses by bidder company shareholders see Dent, Unprofita-
ble Mergers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 777, 778-79 (1986).
For other relevant discussions, see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An
Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1025-26 (1981); Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra
note 16, at 277-92.
Roll also asserts that "[i]f we could be sure that (a) the bid was unanticipated and (b)
the bid conveys no information about the bidder other than that it is seeking a combination
with a particular target," then his hypothesis would predict a price decline on announce-
ment of a bid and a price decline on winning a bid. Roll, supra note 21, at 201.
This too is an important concept. If the bid is motivated by hubris, then an efficient
market should downgrade the value of the hubris-driven bidder. Indeed, even if immediate
market gain to target exceeds immediate market loss to bidder, the hubris phenomenon may
still be valid in modified form. That is, the market may simply value the target highly, due
to the excessive price being paid by the bidder. Although the extreme version of hubris
states that all markets are operating efficiently and takeovers result in combined losses, a
modified, less extreme, version of hubris, defined as irrational bidders bidding too high, is
consistent with gains to target exceeding losses to bidder shareholders.
Additional evidence for the hubris or winner's curse hypothesis is found in Professor
Michael E. Porter's recent study. He studied the diversification records of 33 large U.S.
companies over the 1950-86 period. He concluded that "most of them had divested many
more acquisitions than they had kept. The corporate strategies of most companies have
dissipated instead of created shareholder value." Porter, From Comparative Advantage to
Corporate Strategy, 65 HARVARD Bus. REV. 43, 43 (1987). With reference to the problem of
bidders overpaying he asserts:
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PART II: IMPACT OF HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS ON LEGAL LITERATURE
Roll's article is a good example of an intelligent effort to ex-
Acquisitions expose it to an increasingly efficient merger market. An acquirer
beats the market if it pays a price not fully reflecting the prospects of the new
unit. Yet multiple bidders are commonplace, information flows rapidly, and in-
vestment bankers and other intermediaries work aggressively to make the market
as efficient as possible.... Acquisition premiums are high and reflect the acquired
company's future prospects-sometimes too well. Philip Morris paid more than
four times book value for Seven-Up Company, for example. Simple arithmetic
means that profits had to more than quadruple to sustain the preacquisiton.
Id. at 49.
Ravenscraft & Schere concluded in their recent study, "Tender offer targets of the
1960s and early 1970s entered their acquirers' organizations with a profit record slightly
inferior to that of their two-digit industry peers. Nine years later on average they performed
appreciably less well." Ravenscraft & Scherer, Life After Takeover, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 147,
154 (Dec. 1987). They add that an important reason for negative after takeover performance
was the "writeup of asset values stemming from the payment of acquisition premiums. But
those premiums were supposedly paid in anticipation of enhanced profitability, which is not
evident in our post-takeover operating income and cash flow regressions. This is an anomaly
for the theory of takeovers as efficiency-increasing mechanism." Id. at 155.
Bradley, Desai & Kim in an event study conclude that a successful tender offer in-
creases the combined value of the target and acquiring firms by an average of 7.4%. Brad-
ley, Desai and Kim, Synergistic Gain From Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Be-
tween the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (May 1988).
However, they also find that the abnormal returns for acquiring firms in 52 tender offers
during the latest period they studied, January 1981-December 1984 was a negative 2.93%
(although the combined values of bidder and target were positive). They also conclude that
"our data indicate that the average white knight pays 'too much' for the target it acquires."
Id. at 25. They recognize that multiple bidding may result in bidder overvaluations and that
the "acquirer's shareholders will suffer a capital loss." Id. at 29. But where bidders overpay,
a positive combined value for the target and bidder shareholders may merely reflect the
markets evaluation of the hubris driven bonanza give to the target. An event study is a
measure of short-term immediate reaction. Porter, supra at 45, argues "short-term market
reaction is a highly imperfect measure of the long-term success of diversification, and no
self-respecting executive would judge a corporate strategy this way."
In a recent study Veraiya found support for the winner's curse hypothesis in the case of
corporate takeovers. He concluded: "For a sample of corporate takeovers our results also
show that, on average, the winning bid premium significantly overstates the capital market's
estimate of the expected takeover gain .... These results also provide support for Roll's
(1986) observation that 'Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their
targets' (p. 197). The hubris hypothesis may be viewed as a special case of the winner's
curse hypothesis . ." Veraiya, The 'Winner's Curse' Hypothesis and Corporate Takeovers,
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON., Sept. 1988, 209-16.
Veraiya also states that "at least for this sample, the dollar premium paid to target
shareholders is, on average associated with a dollar loss of like magnitude for bidder share-
holders." Id. at 215-16. He also concludes that "pre-acquisition winning Buyer profitability
is positively related to the magnitude of overpayment." Id. at 216-17.
In a recent article, Black advances the theory that "for many takeovers, target share-
holders gain partly because the bidder pays too much. These overpayments don't cause bid-
der stock prices to drop because investors already expect the bidder to waste the money,.one
way or another." Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 599
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plain stock price information based upon behavioral theory. "Be-
havioral" in this context connotes emotion or excessive self-confi-
dence, as distinguished from cool calculation of future gain. The
available data surely contain considerable information indicating
negative aggregate gain on takeovers. Hubris is a convincing expla-
nation, given the infrequent episodic nature of takeovers .5 There
is less opportunity, perhaps, for rational players to eliminate the
hubris operators.55 However, there are data to the contrary. Until
conclusive data become available, legal and economic scholars
must delay final conclusions about the welfare effect of unsolicited
takeovers. However, by any reasonable judgment, the data pointing
to negative aggregate gain are disturbing.
Roll's thesis makes a plausible case to the effect that bidder
shareholders, on average, los more than target shareholders gain
over pre-bid market values after the takeovers. This hypothesis
also indicates that, on average, unsolicited tender offers adversely
affect target shareholders prior to the takeover. For if bidders in-
deed proceed from hubris, and not from a monitoring role, then
unsolicited takeovers do not perform a monitoring of agency
costs. 57 Hence, ex ante, takeovers do not raise the price of shares
and, indeed, may, on average, depress "them'8
Further explanation on this point is appropriate. One of the
most widely accepted theories of takeovers is that they serve to
(1989). He is sympathetic to the winner's curse theory yet disagrees with Roll's hubris the-
ory. Id. at 625.
" See Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL-
OGY, 261, 261-65 (1965). The study involved psychologists' confidence in their clinical set-
ting. See id. at 262. The study concluded that confidence, but not predictive accuracy, in-
creased when additional information became available. See id. at 263-64.
"' "ITihe classic model of prices determined by the atomistic behavior of numerous
individuals seems far from the process involved in a typical merger .... ." Kleidon, supra
note 18, at 312.
5" The argument is that smart money will knock out non-rational players. See Shiller,
supra note 19, at 319 (discussing studies that cast doubt on smart money theory).
56 For a particularly powerful article on the value of takeovers and the rational assump-
tion, see Jensen, supra note 5.
'7 For the seminal discussion of the market for control and its disciplining impact on
management, see Manne, supra note 5, at 110-20, and Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976). Agency cost is a term referring to the inefficiency cost arising from the conflict of
interest between management and shareholders. Agency costs are kept to a lower level by
the monitoring function of rival bidder control groups.
18 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 1174-82, 1188-90. Easterbrook and Fis-
chel had argued that takeovers, by disciplining management, encourage investment and
hence, in general, raise the level of stock prices. Id. at 1165-74.
[Vol. 63:511
SCHOLARSHIP AND TAKEOVERS
discipline management. Potential bidders search the universe of
possible target corporations. When they perceive a mismanaged
corporation, they bid at a premium over market price. They expect
to recoup the premium by managing the acquired corporation in a
more efficient manner than did the incumbent management.
Therefore, the stock prices of corporations rise prior to takeovers
because shareholders are willing to pay more, knowing that corpo-
rations are monitored by bidder corporations." However, if bidders
systematically misjudge the value of target corporations due to the
hubris or winner's curse phenomenon, they are systematically mis-
calculating the nature and extent of alleged target management in-
competence. Thus, their monitoring role is more imperfect than
anticipated by the theory that rests on bidder efficiency in moni-
toring inefficient targets. Indeed, the hubris phenomenon is consis-
tent with bidders, on average, selecting out efficient targets on
which to bid. This is the basis for asserting above that the hubris
phenomenon is consistent with a general pre-takeover lowering of
the price of shares of stock of publicly held corporations as a result
of the unsolicited takeover movement.
Takeovers arguably benefit target shareholders after the ac-
quisition, in that shareholders-or at least those who tender or sell
in the market to arbitrageurs-gain some or all of the premium
paid over market price prior to announcement of the bid. 0 How-
ever, if hubris moves bidders, well run targets will be bought out as
often as those that are poorly run. It is, therefore, a reasonable
prediction that many target shareholder groups would have done
better had the takeover not occurred, since long run future gains
from competent incumbent management might well have exceeded
the gain from the hubris-driven takeover. It is possible, however,
that the hubris-driven takeover price is so high that it exceeds
what competent management might accomplish even in the long
run.
The bidders' hubris will also adversely harm bidder sharehold-
ers prior to the takeover, since the hubris phenomenon will depress
the general level of shares, or more particularly, the prices of clas-
ses of corporations likely to engage in takeovers, assuming those
prices can be identified. It will cause losses after the event, since
61 See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
11-12 J. FIN. EcoN. 5, 5-50 (1983) (exhaustive summary of data on takeovers).
1O See Jensen, supra note 5, at 6. "Premiums in hostile offers historically exceed 30
percent on average and in recent times have averaged about 50 percent." Id.
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bidders' shareholders will lose after a takeover is announced.
The hubris phenomenon renders suspect the significance of a
series of major law review articles in recent years debating whether
the authors' distaste for target defensive maneuvers should allow
for facilitating competitive takeover bids."' The authors, all promi-
nent scholars in the tender offer field, agreed that markets were
temporarily inefficient, and that takeovers, on average, increased
synergy or displaced incompetent management. The articles de-
bated whether increasing the number of bidders maximized or de-
creased aggregate gain from takeovers. If the hubris phenomenon
is correct, the debate's importance is decreased. Where takeovers,
on average, produce negative gain, the question becomes whether
we should chill takeover activity or, at a minimum, devise new bid-
ding techniques, not whether we should increase competitive take-
over bidding. The argument that facilitating competitive bids will,
on average, increase aggregate gains to target and bidder share-
holders contradicts the hubris phenomenon, since the successful
bids will, on average, result in aggregate loss.
Furthermore, the issue is empirical: given the authors' belief in
the validity of stock price studies, 2 their debate turns on the di-
rection of the data. If the data conclusively prove that aggregate
gains resulting from takeovers are, on average, negative, the hubris
phenomenon is valid, and competitive auctions will merely maxi-
mize the "winner's curse. '08 That phenomenon, consistent with
hubris, suggests that in the case of competitive bids, the "success-
ful bidder will tend to be the one that most overestimates the tar-
get's value."' 6 4
An additional example to consider at this juncture is the fa-
mous Easterbrook and Fischel article on takeovers and efficient
market data. This influential article advanced the notion that
61 See R. GiLSON, supra note 10, at 765-84.
61 "The efficient-markets ... hypothesis posits that security prices reflect all available
information. Hence, unanticipated changes in regulation result in a current change in secur-
ity prices, and the price change is an unbiased estimate of the value of the change in future
cash flows to the firm. This hypothesis underlies a variety of methods for estimating the
effects of unanticipated regulatory change on shareholder wealth." Schwert, Using Finan-
cial Data to Measure Effects of Financial Regulation, 24 LAW & EcoN. 121, 121-22 (1981).
Event studies are a typical method to measure the impact of data change, such as increased
deficits, on prices of securities. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
S See Veraya & Ferris, supra note 40, at 64.
64 Id. at 65.
" Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5.
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management should take no action to resist takeovers, even if, af-
ter the takeover, such defensive action would increase the price re-
ceived by target shareholders.6 This conclusion finds its basis in
the theory that the corporate market for control disciplines incum-
bent management. Underlying that basis was a traditional, efficient
market, rational choice hypothesis. 7 Reliance was placed on event
studies to the extent they demonstrated that bidders went after
inefficient managements or searched for so-called synergistic merg-
ers."' Hence, facilitating takeovers would increase, on average, the
price of the universe of publicly held corporate stock. The loss
caused by management's resistance will arguably exceed any gain
realized after the takeover. This is an empirical point: if, for exam-
ple, the hubris phenomenon dominates, the Easterbrook and Fis-
chel thesis would appear to be fatally flawed.
A related empirical point is whether increasing takeover
prices, ex post, will increase significantly the universe of likely tar-
get investors, and thereby increase the number of targets, such
that bidder incentive rises with the growing "likelihood that a bid-
der can locate a target of sufficient attraction." 9 If this ex post
phenomenon exceeds the Easterbrook and Fischel ex ante impact
then a good argument can be made for facilitating some manage-
ment resistance, on the ground that the net effect is to increase
bidding. Economists and other social scientists are usually better
trained than most law professors to conduct such studies. Of
course, as previously noted, if Roll's hypothesis-which is ulti-
mately based on theories developed by psychologists studying be-
havior under conditions of uncertainty-is correct the focus of dis-
cussion shifts radically. The rationale for increasing bidders'
incentives disappears, or at least becomes more complex.
Another major subject of legal literature regarding takeovers
has been termed the "prisoner's dilemma. 7 0 Scholars point out
68 See id. at 1164.
17 Id. at 1165-66. This rational choice theory provides that since estimation by investors
leads to prices which are informative as to value of shares, "[i]t is very unlikely that price
and 'value' will diverge in large markets for shares." Id. at 1165.
68 Id. at 1170-72.
69 Haddock, Macy & Mc Chesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701, 724 (1987).
70 See Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J.
48, 49 (1986). This refers to a situation in which the impossibility of joint action leads indi-
viduals to accept deals inferior to that which they could have negotiated in common. Thus,
target shareholders may be forced to tender at prices inferior to that which shareholders
1989]
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that the inability of target shareholders to coordinate bargaining
permits bidders to succeed at lower premiums than would other-
wise result. Therefore, suggestions are made to facilitate such coor-
dination. One approach is to condition partial takeovers on the af-
firmative vote of disinterested shareholders in the target.1 But if
aggregate returns are negative, then there is, on average, a real so-
cial loss from takeovers. Legislative solutions that minimize the
target shareholders' "prisoner's dilemma" merely increase the
transfer of wealth from bidders to target shareholders in the con-
text of a transaction that maximizes losses to investors generally.
PART III: OTHER ANOMALIES IN THE FINANCE LITERATURE
The Roll article is not the only recent work to question the
most sweeping versions of the efficient market-rational behavior
school. A group of scholars, the "investor behaviorists," have un-
earthed interesting evidence that during certain periods investors
may behave irrationally.72 For example, professors De Bondt and
Thaler demonstrated that investors "overreact" to unexpected and
dramatic news events. 3 They proved that "portfolios of prior
'losers' are found to outperform prior 'winners' though they are a
greater risk.74 There is no adequate explanation for the great
amount of positive excess returns earned by the loser portfolios
every year. Surprisingly, "the effect is observed as late as five years
after portfolio formation."' 5
The recent October 1987 crash reinforced the validity of the
irrationalist approach. Investors appeared to have overbid share
prices in August, and then reacted excessively on the down side.
These results tend to contradict the efficient market views
that prices simply reflect rational predictions of future investment
returns and that higher returns are trade-offs for higher risks.76 Al-
acting together could have obtained. Id. at 50-51.
7 See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1760-61 (1985).
72 See Donnelly, Investors' Overreactions May Yield Opportunities in the Stock Mar-
ket, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1988, Sec. 2, at 21, col. 4.
7. See De Bondt & Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, Vol. XL no. 3, J. FIN.
793 (1985).
"' Id. at 804. "Thirty-six months after portfolio formation, the losing stocks have
earned about 25% more than the winners, even though the latter are significantly more
risky." Id.
7 Id.
76 See R. GILSON, supra note 10, at 133-55.
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though these behavioral theorists do not question the ultimate in-
fluence that fundamental economic factors will have on share
prices, they have proven that the gravity of irrational movements
cannot be discounted.
Like the Roll paper, these developments in psychology may be
fundamental. Legal scholars must await development by psychol-
ogy scholars before absorbing them into their essentially derivative
legal scholarship.
One exponent of the rational assumption describes the impact
of psychological approaches as follows:
[H]ow much of existing knowledge is likely to be lost . . . [?]
Clearly, the answer is very much since virtually all extant results
based on stock price data rely strongly on the informational con-
tent in prices .... [F]or example, consider event studies ....
Today, arguments are appearing in courts... that evidence based
on stock prices should be disregarded."
PART IV: CHAOS THEORY
A. Orthodox Theory and Mayhem in the Markets
There is yet another possible threat to the established doc-
trine. The stock market crash in October 198778 raises questions
about the complete applicability of the efficient market thesis.
This theory, broadly and oversimply stated, assumes that stock
prices rapidly reflect new data about the future earnings of a cor-
poration.79 A related assumption is that "stock prices can be re-
garded as the present value of rationally forecasted future cash
flows."80 As Shiller notes: "Obviously the efficient markets theory
77Kleidon, supra note 18, at 308.
7' The SEC reported:
The Dow Jones Industrial Average ('DJIA') index of 30 New York Stock Exchange
('NYSE') stocks, had reached an intra-day high of 2746.65 on August 27, 1987. On
October 2, the DJIA closed at 2640.99. During the week of October 5, the index
declined by 158.78 points; during the week of October 12, by 235.47 points. On
October 19, the DJIA declined 508.32 points, and by its low point mid-day on
October 20 it had declined to 1708.70, or over 1000 points (37%) below its August
25 high .... [B]y October 30 the DJIA stood at 1,994, down over 26% from its
August high.
MARKET REGUL. Div. SEC, THE OcT. 1987 MARKET BREAK, at xi (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter
1987 MARKET BREAKI.
"' See Shiller, supra note 19, at 317.
80 Kleidon, supra note 18, at 286.
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
does capture an element of the truth. For example, when impor-
tant concrete information about the future earnings potential of a
corporation becomes public, the price of the stock in that company
tends to jump immediately."'" To the extent that prices turn on
irrational fads or fancies or hubris, the hypothesis is weakened.
The October crash raises a variety of doubts about the effi-
cient market-rational expectations theory.8 2 Many have attributed
the sudden drop to fears about the effects of trade, budget deficits,
and/or the proposed bill to raise taxes on hostile takeovers. 8 Why
did the market rise for years in the presence of the deficits? Why
did it suddenly drop? Of course, one answer is that the drop was
not caused by the deficits, but rather by some other fundamental
factor. If so, what is this other factor? Perhaps it was the proposed
tax measure. However, for months after the crash, tax fears abated,
and yet the market, until recently, remained depressed, compared
to the August highs preceding the October 19 crash. This question
can be broadened: if fundamental factors, such as certain basic
trends in the economy, caused the crash, why, as mentioned previ-
ously, did the crash occur when it did and not earlier? Also, if the
deficits caused the crash, why did the markets recover some of the
drop in post-October days?
The inability to ascertain which fundamental factors, if any,
caused the crash, and in what proportion, further demonstrates the
extent of our ignorance. Everyone is guessing about the causes.
8 Shiller, supra note 19, at 317.
8'2 The SEC report made the following interesting admission: "[T]he Report does not
answer the question of why in October of 1987 the value of common stocks was reduced by
approximately 30%. We may never know what precise combination of investor psychology,
economic developments and trading technologies caused the events of October." 1987 MAR-
KEr BREAK, supra note 78, at xi.
83 Professors Robert J. Shiller and John Pound of the Investor Behavior Project at Yale
University sent out questionnaires on the crash. The most significant news story for inves-
tors was "early news of the crash itself-the 200-point drop in the Dow the morning of
Oct.19." Shiller, Investors Acted from the Gut on Black Monday, Hartford Courant, Apr.
17, 1988, § C, at 1, col. 2. The next most important news story was the decline in U.S. stock
prices the week before. Id. Another concern was the federal debt. Id. Very few investors
mentioned the House Ways and Means Committee agreement to raise taxes on corporate
takeovers. Id. "The survey findings thus suggest that Black Monday is best explained as a
vicious circle-price declines feeding on previous price declines." Id. The Yale professors
discount the importance of portfolio insurance. Id at 4, col. 3. The professors also write that
the investors "often wrote 'gut feeling' as their primary forecasting method and many
seemed to be guessing about the psychology of other investors, trying to figure out when
others might start selling." Id. The author warns that "[m]ost economists rarely use such
surveys; they are skeptical of explanations people give for their behavior." Id. at 1, col. 4.
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Some have argued that the market was rationally depressed for
many months after the crash-as compared to August 1987-be-
cause the volatility in the markets requires a lower price to com-
pensate investors for the greater risk. 4 Perhaps this is so; however,
there is a problem. Assuming that there was greater risk, it is un-
clear whether the risk was caused by fundamental rational factors
or irrational psychological factors such as the deflation of hubris on
the part of many investors. No one has a completely satisfactory
answer. In any event, if so-called unknown fundamental factors
caused the greater risk, then the greater volatility theory is a digni-
fied answer to disguise our ignorance of the fundamental factors. If
the greater risk flows from irrational psychological factors such as
fear and panic, then alleged "greater risk" also seems a dignified
manner of admitting our ignorance, since we have no adequate the-
ories of when and why panic arises.
Many have argued that the existence of index arbitrage and
portfolio insurance"6 accelerated the October drop. The various
stock market reports differ on this point and are inconclusive.87
Certainly they all emphasize that the crash was caused by a combi-
nation of many factors, and that specifying the impact of any one
cause would be difficult.8 This vague conclusion is a polite method
84 See T. Schneeweis, Remarks at ABA Conference Program, The General Effect of
New Financial Instruments on Traditional Markets (Philadelphia, Pa. March 26, 1988).
" See, e.g., 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 78, at xiii. The SEC reported as follows:
If the value of the stocks in an index is known, it is possible to calculate the
theoretical value of a futures contract on that index .... When sufficient premi-
ums or discounts to the theoretical value occur, index arbitrageurs buy in the
lower priced market (stock or derivative) and sell in the other, higher priced
market.
Id. at 1-3, 1-4 (footnotes omitted).
86 Id. "The 'insurance' protection comes through... selling futures ... as stock values
decline." Id. at 1-2. Arguably, the institutions drove future prices down as the market broke.
Other institutions bought futures and sold stocks, hence accelerating the break. Id. at 1-2, 1-
3.
87 See, e.g., Div. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, Div. OF TRADING AND MKTS., U.S. COMMODITY Fu-
TURES TRADING COMM'N, STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTO-
BER 1987, 94 (1988). "In sum, the analysis of intra-day trading does not support a contention
that on October 19 the stock market fell as fast and as far as it did because of a continu-
ously intensifying interaction between index arbitrage stock sales and portfolio insurance
selling in the futures market." Id. But see 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 78, at xiii. The
SEC concluded that "the existence of futures on stock indexes and use of the various strate-
gies involving 'program trading' were significant factors in accelerating and exacerbating the
declines." Id.
8 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., FINANCIAL MARKETS, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON
THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 5 (1988). In a recent article, Professor Richard Roll may have
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of expressing lack of knowledge. If these technical reasons have
such great effect, how do the nonfundamental factors relate to the
impact of fundamental factors such as inflation and deficits? We
have no satisfactory answer. More particularly, if technical trading
devices cause great changes in prices, then the efficient market-
rational choice hypothesis-that prices turn on predictions of fu-
ture values-appears to be weakened.
Some of the stock crash reports appear to assert that fear and
hysteria, in conjunction with the ease of using derivative products
to sell large quantities quickly, may have had an impact. Fear?
That raises the psychological versus the rational explanation once
again.
B. The New Science of Disorder
There is a developing mathematical theory, called the Chaos
theory, that may hold an answer to the October crash."' It is a new
discipline that finds a kind of order in disorder. The theory can
disproved some of the popular explanations for the October crash. Roll, The International
Crash of October 1987, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 19. He argued that "no one has
been able to substantiate the underlying cause for the October market decline." Id. at 20.
He compared price movements of 23 markets around the world and concluded that portfolio
insurance, index arbitrage, options, futures hedging and a specialist system were not the
significant factors. Id. at 32. The crucial variable in explaining how much each market
moved was the underlying volatility of each market, that is, its historic inclination to move
up and down over time. Roll postulates that there was a "fundamental, worldwide triggering
variable [that] caused the crash," Id. at 31, but he is unable to identify it. Id. at 31-32. All
he could demonstrate was that "the relative movement of each market was simply the usual
relation between that particular market and the [unknown] underlying factor." Id. at 31.
In a very recent study, M. Mitchell and J. Netter, then of the SEC Office of Economic
Analysis presented data to the effect that it was the House Ways and Means Committee
proposed tax bill adversely affecting takeovers that precipitated the large ten percent
United States stock market drop on October 14-16. See supra note 83. This drop, they
theorize, triggered the October 19 crash. OFFICE OF ECONoMIc ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & EXCHG.
COMM'N, TRIGGERING THE 1987 STOCK MARKET CRASH: ANTITAKOVER PROVISIONS IN THE PRO-
POSED HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS TAX BILL? (1989). This contradicts Roll's study, in which
Roll asserted that "the overall pattern of intertemporal price movements in the various
markets suggests the presence of some underlying fundamental factor.., but ... seems
inconsistent with a U.S.- specific macroeconomic event." Roll, supra, at 22. However, Mitch-
ell and Netter state that their "data does not show that the tax bill caused the crash on the
19th, so indeed structural factors must have been important." OFFICE OF ECONomic ANALY-
sis, supra, at 31. Roll's study appeared to disprove any such structural factors however.
"' See J. GLEICK, supra note 25. The potential significance of the Chaos theory for eco-
nomics is explored in Baumol & Bennabib, Chaos, Significance, Mechanism, and Economic
Applications, 3 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 77 (1989).
90 "[TIhe basic idea hinges on looking at what might be called mathematical feedback
loops: expressions whose output can be fed back into them as new input .... From the
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best be introduced by the following incident. Benoit Mandelbrot, a
mathematician, had been studying the patterns of large and small
incomes in an economy."' He was invited by Professor Houthakker,
a Harvard economist, to give a lecture on his findings. When the
mathematician arrived at Harvard, he was surprised to see his
findings already charted on the Professor's blackboard. The dia-
gram had nothing to do with income distribution; it represented
eight years of cotton prices.92
Mandelbrot found similar patterns in both sets of data. He
found that the relations for daily and monthly price changes were
the same:
Each particular price change was random and unpredictable. But
the sequence of changes was independent of scale: curves for daily
price changes and monthly price changes matched perfectly. In-
credibly, analyzed Mandelbrot's way, the degree of variation [in
cotton prices] had remained constant over a tumultuous sixty-
year period that saw two World Wars and a depression.'
This finding indicated that in chaos, or apparent disorder,
there may be discernable patterns. The patterns, however, seem to
be the "effect" of deep-seated mathematical theorems as opposed
to historical causes. Hence, this finding also casts doubt on the as-
sumption of economists that although small ups and downs over
minutes are unpredictable noise, longer changes reflect deep fun-
damental changes such as recession or war.9 4 Mandelbrot also de-
scribed what he calls the "Noah Effect":9 5 prices change in instan-
taneous jumps. It implies discontinuity as distinguished from the
economists' assumption that prices change smoothly-whether
rapidly or slowly."8
Chaos theorists describe what they call "strange attractors. '9 7
These are the shapes data make in areas of disorder and apparent
random behavior.9 8 Each point may be unpredictable, but the data
simplest of such loops, it seemed, both stable patterns and chaotic patterns . .. could
emerge." Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas, Sci. Ara., Nov. 1981, at 22.
91 See J. GLEICK, supra note 25, at 83-84.
02 Id. at 83.
93 Id. at 86.
01 Id. at 85.
95 Id. at 92-93.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 133.
08 Id. at 143.
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as a whole move in apparently ordered shapes. 9e Today, some
economists are looking for strange attractors to explain the appar-
ent random movement of the stock markets. 100
To the mathematical layman, such as this writer, there is a
sort of numbers mystery in this theory. 10 1 There is no longer a kind
of simple determinism in the universe. For example, in meteorol-
ogy, chaos theory questions whether exhaustive knowledge of data
can lead to accurate prediction of the weather. 0 2 Apparently,
chaos sets in over a wide range of data. 03 The scientist cannot
then predict the exact weather, but may be able to forecast the
onset of unpredictable weather. When charted on a computer
screen, the weather may take a particular shape, the strange at-
tractor, although particular points on the map cannot be
predicted.0
Population theory is another example. Biologists assume that
with enough data they can predict the future population of
salmon. 10 5 All they need is complete data on food, predation,
weather, birth rate, and the like. Yet chaos theorists appear to
have demonstrated that this simple 19th century determinism does
not always work. At certain ranges of data input, the population
numbers move disorderly in what we call chaos. 06 The theorists
may be able to predict the onset of the turbulent data, but not the
precise population at given times. 07
99 Id. at 151.
100 Id. at 152.
101 Professor James Ramsey, a New York University economist who has become a spe-
cialist in chaos theory, has stated: "We now know very clearly that stock market prices
cannot be analyzed by the old procedures that we used." Gleick, When Chaos Rules the
Market, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1987, § 3, at i. This article reported that leading economists
and chaos theorists met to explore the new theory. Stanford professor Kenneth J. Arrow
pointed out that Chaos theory tends to disprove the notion of the random walk; that notion
posits that there is no underlying dynamic, but chaos theory sees order in disorder. Id. at 9.
102 See J. GLEICK, supra note 25, at 11-23.
103 Id.
004 Id.
105 Id. at 59-77.
106 Id.
107 Population may be described by a simple equation such as xnext=rx(1-x). Id. at 63.
The parameter 'r' represents a rate of growth. The term '1-x' bounds the growth such that
the population falls or rises as the parameter is varied. Iteration creates fascinating results.
If the parameter is set at certain values, and 'x' is set at a certain value, then 'Xnext' can be
solved for a certain result. Finally, that result is fed back into 'x'. If this is done repeatedly,
a certain periodicity surfaces in the results. That is, numbers or solutions create a repetitive
pattern. But, when the 'r' parameter is changed to a certain range and iterate, at a certain
point, chaos sets in; the solutions will meander without apparent order. See Hofstadter,
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Another example may assist in understanding. Climatologists
attempt to use computers to model the long term variations in
weather. Under some assumptions, the earth would experience a
glaciated surface. 08 Reaching this result would require some severe
external changes. Yet there is another behavior called "almost-in-
transitivity"'109 that shifts from one pattern to another without the
impact of external real world changes such as changes in the
earth's orbit. The chaos theorists opine: "[A]most-intransitivity
might well explain why the earth's climate has drifted in and out
of long Ice Ages at mysterious, irregular intervals. If so, no physical
cause need be found for the timing. The Ice Ages might simply be
a byproduct of chaos." 1 0
Similarly, the stock market may sometimes move in patterns
called 'strange attractors."' These patterns do not bear a causal
relationship to fundamental factors-such as war and inflation-in
the simple sense that efficient market rational choice theory as-
sumes. The impact of this new theory on ordinary law and eco-
nomics scholarship is obscure. However, the traditional event
supra note 90, at 24-28. The patterned results close in on a number or group of numbers
that are called attractors. Where chaos enters, the solutions or results move erratically in-
side a restricted range, which, when diagrammed, frequently create a "delicate filigree that
recalls the 'faint fantastic traceries made by frost on glass'." Id. at 42 (quoting music critic
James Huneker). This shape is called a strange attractor. Id.
This iteration, within a fairly simple kind of mathematical equation, seems to capture
the study of turbulence in hydrodynamic flow, "the erratic population fluctuations in
predator-prey relations," id. at 31, and possibly, many other chaotic patterns in nature such
as stock market movement. Chaotic systems are extremely sensitive to minute perturba-
tions. Small changes result in large disturbances. J. GLEIcK, supra note 25, at 23.
Mathematicians have captured the formula for predicting when turbulence or chaos will
erupt in certain areas. Id. at 180.
"[A]ny section of such an attractor, when blown up, reveals itself to be just as exqui-
sitely detailed as was the larger picture from which it was taken. In other words, there is an
infinite regress of detail, a never ending nesting of pattern within pattern." Hofstadter,
supra note 90, at 42. These are similar to the "fractals" of Mandelbrot. Id. See B. MANDEL-
BROT, FRACTALS: FORM CHANCE AND DIMENSION (1978). This is what Mandelbrot found in the
cotton prices. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. Within chaos he found a form
of order. But chaos means that the mathematician cannot predict a future price where tur-
bulence or chaos has started. It is possible that the October 1987 crash, as discussed in the
text, is an example of chaos. Discovery of the "strange attractor" will not enable prediction
of a given price, but it will amount to an advance in knowledge in that we may be able to
predict the beginnings of turbulence.
108 J. GLEICK, supra note 25 at 170. While a glaciated surface is possible, it should be
noted that it has really never occurred. See id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
" Id. at 271.
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study which underlies the past two decades of stock market re-
search would be suspect. Needless to say, the assumption that cer-
tain events, such as poison pills,'12 hostile takeovers," 3 and state
takeover laws,"' have a simple deterministic impact on stock
prices may have to be reexamined.
For example, the assumption that the bill proposing a new tax
on takeovers caused the October 19 crash" 5 may not stand up if
chaos theory is valid. Hence, the related assumption that takeovers
are valuable does not follow from that drop in the stock market
averages. Likewise, the assumption that takeover activity contrib-
uted to a general "overvaluation" of the market in August" 6 may
be inaccurate.
There is yet another aspect to chaos theory. The efficient mar-
ket, random walk theory assumes that observers cannot predict the
future price of a stock or the market. Once data are impounded in
the price of a stock, only new material data will change that price;
yet, the nature of that new data cannot be accurately predicted.
Hence, so-called fundamental analysis cannot serve to predict the
future price of a stock. 1 Likewise, prior stock prices cannot serve
as a guide to future prices. This is the so-called weak version of the
theory." '8 Thus, modern orthodoxy in finance offers a theory for
the essential unknowability of the future with respect to the sub-
ject it studies. This is, on reflection, a fairly remarkable confirma-
tion of ignorance about the future of the market. Chaos theory,
however, postulates an inherent underlying dynamic in the turbu-
lence of the market, as demonstrated by the Mandelbrot analysis
described above." 9 It offers a method for predicting the onset of
turbulence or chaos but does not necessarily involve a simple de-
terminism between events, such as budget deficits and prices, as
currently believed. Hence, if "strange attractors" are found ulti-
mately in the market, the future will prove to be more predictable
than current theory believes.
M See generally Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1352-57 (Del. 1985)
(discussion of a poison pill).
,, For a recent exhaustive discussion of this phenomenon, see Lipton, supra note 5.
11 See id. at 29.
115 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
11 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, 1988 REPORT 9.
"1 See Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1041-56 (1977).
See id. at 1041-44.




This analysis, like most other articles on takeovers, will not
settle the issues discussed herein.120 The scholarship on unsolicited
takeovers does not seem to proceed in the manner of certain
"hard" sciences, such as physics, where a form of linear progress in
knowledge is made. After a decade of law and economics-and
anti-law and anti-economics literature-basic issues such as the
nature, source and existence of long-term aggregate gains or losses
from takeovers are still unresolved.
Perhaps this field is too complex for the current methodologi-
cal resources of economics or psychology. It may be that the hubris
analysis will be completely validated by further empirical studies.
It may be that the stock price studies considered by Professor Roll
and others may suffer from fundamental flaws because the under-
lying assumptions, such as a fairly strong notion of efficient mar-
kets, may prove invalid for the studies considered. Marvel of mar-
vels, the strange attractor may be found, and all previous scholarly
bets will be lost.
Even if some of the anomalies in finance economics withstand
the vigor of further testing, this does not mean that economists
and psychologists will soon abandon their current theories. Popper
has argued that the impact of crucial experiments will overturn
important old theories.1"' Kuhn, however, has cautioned against
imprudent abandonment of a theory simply because an anomaly is
present in its supporting data. Many of today's most accepted the-
ories exhibited anomalies that eventually were removed by patient
observation and testing.122 The point, nevertheless, is that the cor-
120 See Kleidon, supra note 18, at 285-286.
121 K. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1972).
122 See Kleidon, supra note 18, at 286.
How then, to return to the initial question, do scientists respond to the awareness
of an anomaly in the fit between theory and nature? What has just been said
indicates that even a discrepancy unaccountably larger than that experienced in
other applications of the theory need not draw any very profound response. There
are always some discrepancies. Even the most stubborn ones usually respond at
last to normal practice. Very often scientists are willing to wait, particularly if
there are many problems available in other parts of the field. We have already
noted, for example, that during the sixty years after Newton's original computa-
tion, the predicted motion of the moon's perigee remained only half of that ob-
served. As Europe's best mathematical physicists continued to wrestle unsuccess-
fully with the well-known discrepancy, there were occasional proposals for a
modification of Newton's inverse square law. But no one took these proposals very
seriously, and in practice this patience with a major anomaly proved justified.
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porate law scholar is bound by the Posnerian notion of law as a
dependent field. 123 The scholar may tend toward a practitioner-ori-
ented direction, that is, the writing of treatises that describe the
current state of the cases and the statutes. This is an honorable
pursuit as long as one values the more expeditious finding of the
law by busy practitioners. Deeper scholarship requires the law
scholar to do the kind of work that Roll did, 24 or the kind of em-
pirical work that Professors Veraiya and Ferris did 25 in attempt-
ing to validate or disprove the Roll thesis. Many corporate law
scholars pursue studies which approach this style. They take an
economic theory or group of theories and suggest that it is applica-
ble to the case at hand. They look to empirical studies, usually
stock price studies, and cite the literature that supports or ques-
tions the model.
There is a disturbing professional problem in all this. A num-
ber of law scholars have been able to do seminal work in the fields
of law and economics and corporate law. Easterbrook and Fischel,
for example, introduced important relationships between economic
research and the law that other legal scholars were forced to con-
front. Through a series of seminal articles, Dean Henry Manne
played a major role in relating law to the discipline of economics. 26
However, with the exception of a number of notable pieces, there
is a kind of hubris in this general effort. Law scholars appear to
believe that they can produce creative work in these fields based
upon a law degree and an energetic self-study effort in interdisci-
plinary areas. It may, however, be too much to expect that law
professors and attorneys can creatively master two fields, based
upon the traditional law school education, plus a course or two in
economics or psychology. In any event, success, in the sense of cre-
ative scholarship, means experiment and research in fields other
than the law. The latter then becomes simply another subject for
experts in psychology, economics, mathematics, and the like, to
study.
Clairaut in 1750 was able to show that only the mathematics of the application
had been wrong and that Newtonian theory could stand as before.
Id. (quoting T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 81 (1970)).
122 See Posner, supra note 1, at 778.
124 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Manne, supra notes 5 & 27. A number of other legal scholars have also
mastered the skills of research in other social sciences, including economics.
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